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It is widely accepted today that there are three main approaches to radio spectrum management: The evolution of radio technology may soon make other paradigms practical, but current thinking about spectrum management is still dominated by these approaches. 1 Each has advantages and disadvantages and they can co-exist, along with multiple variants within each mode. However, transitions from one mode to another are neither rigid nor symmetrical, nor are they equally ease to navigate. Thus, what will appear to be the optimum mix of channel assignment schemes depends on one's starting-point, the sequence and difficulty of moves into new regulatory spaces, and the state of technology.
It is easy to relax restrictions on the transfer of existing licences, so this is a step that a growing minority of countries is willing to take. 2 Relaxing restrictions on the type of service and technology that licence holders may implement is trickier, but synergies with rights trading are significant, so this option appeals to a similar -albeit smaller -set of countries.
3 Despite significant differences in procedures and outcomes, the tradable/flexible/market approach and the administrative approach are both based on individualised spectrum access rights which are at least semiexclusive. Without some degree of exclusivity there is nothing to assign or trade. On the other hand, no user has any exclusive rights in a licence-exempt commons. That, plus the absence of an application→decision →permission gateway to spectrum access distinguishes this regime from the familiar framework of frequency management. 4 Eliminating the need for an official permit to exploit frequency resources makes licence-exempt bands different in principle from licenced spectrum access, and the principle at stake is important in the contexts of economic, political and civil rights. According to Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights -to which more than 150 countries have acceded:
"Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."
That right is not absolute, however. Particularly relevant to radio licencing is Article 19(3)'s recognition that the need to protect "public order" may limit exercise of the right when harm is caused. On the other hand, the Covenant establishes that a state's right to interfere with its citizens' communications is also not absolute, particularly when national security, public order, morals or health are not at risk.
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Physics provides a metaphor which may be useful here. Careful measurements have shown that the characteristics of a free electron differ from what one would expect if space were truly empty. Instead they suggest an electron surrounded by a cloud of "virtual" particles momentarily emerging from and dissolving back into vacuum. In a similar way, a "naked" right like freedom of expression is conceptually simple and clear, but in the real world, implementations always "cloak" abstractions, creating complex situations whose outcome can be counter-intuitive. That is not to minimize the value or utility of the abstraction.
So while licence-exempt bands are different from licenced bands in principle -and the principle involved is very important -the way licence-exempt bands are implemented makes for different kinds of difference and these are important, too.
WiFi in Africa
An interesting finding from Neto's 2004 survey of regulatory policies for licence exempt bands in Africa was that regulators -at least on that continent -tend to impose tighter restrictions on unlicenced radio activities than on licenced, counteracting benefits that could come from a freer regime: This contradicts the naive assumption that unlicenced bands constitute a more permissive environment than licenced bands -as is indeed the case in some other parts of the world.
Insects cannot fly
In many regions, the popularity of licence-exempt bands among equipment producers and end-users is unprecedented. According to IDTechEx, 2.5 billion RFID tags were sold by the start of 2006 plus another 10 Bluetooth's modest link distance and data transmission rate restrict its range of potential applications but it is already expanding beyond the domain of personal audio to support medical implants, bar-code readers, running shoes and interactive kiosks. WiFi has been used mainly to link personal computers to each other and to the Internet but it is finding its way into a wide range of other products, from picture frames, industrial sensors, MP3 players and mobile phones to farm irrigation systems and parking meters.
It has been widely noted that the availability of licence-exempt spectrum stimulates innovation in products and services. As the ITU's Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2004-5: Licensing in an Era of Convergence observed:
"more and more policy-makers are questioning the utility of licencing and demanding that licences be adapted to achieve policy goals without hindering market development and technological advancement... The allocation of spectrum for licence-exempt use is increasingly viewed as a catalyst for the development of more efficient and cost-effective wireless technologies..."
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An advantage of open access, service neutral, shared bands is that there seem to be innumerable applications which were not predictably lucrative enough to justify the cost of securing a licence, but which proved valuable in the aggregate once they existed. It is a well-known problem in market research that people often don't know they want something new until it exists. So it is highly desirable to have space in the radio frequency spectrum for mass market experiments. Many see an analogy with the Internet: the ability to release new content and applications to a potentially global audience at relatively low cost and without difficult authorisation procedures seems to stimulate creativity and new business activity like nothing else.
12
No phenomenon of such scale can avoid attracting idolisers and detractors. Spread spectrum's success in conquering the noisy ISM bands made it seem that a solution to the perennial problems of interference and channel scarcity might finally be at hand, leading to calls for the de-regulation of radio. 13 Meanwhile, economists who think spectrum should be treated as just another commodity tend to inflate the difference between licence-exempt and licenced, recasting difference as opposition. Exclusive vs. pooled rights can then be polemicised as economically-sound versus economically-unsound.
14 Saying that unlicenced bands are uneconomic evokes the memory of August Magnan, a French entymologist who wrote in 1934:
"Tout d'abord poussé par ce qui fait en aviation, j'ai appliqué aux insectes les lois de la resistance de l'air, et je suis arrivé avec M. Sainte-Lague à cette conclusion que leur vol es impossible." 15 (Impelled primarily by what is done in aviation, I applied to insects the laws of air resistance, and I arrived with Mr. St.-Lague at this conclusion, that for them flight is impossible.)
Framing the discussion as an either/or policy choice obscures "the deep connections between the supposedly opposed property and commons positions in the spectrum debate," as Werbach put it. 16 Market forces obviously operate in licence-exempt bands even without spectrum pricing -through equipment purchase decisions by countless individuals at the retail level and through manufacturers' product development and marketing decisions at the wholesale level. Regulatory criteria for equipment type acceptance constrain these forces -though not as much as licence conditions limit the choices of purchasers, designers and producers of radio equipment for licenced use. In that sense, licence-exempt bands are arenas for more creative competition among equipment vendors and service providers than the licenced bands. As Wu pointed out, "permissionless market entry is one of the holy grails of an effective market system" 17 and licence-exempt bands come closer to that ideal than other parts of the spectrum. The European Commission's Authorisation Directive 18 takes a similar line, deprecating "individual rights of use" requirements for electronic communication as limiting competition unnecessarily -as economically unsound, in other words.
Many European countries -and countries elsewhere -use class licences or general authorisation to approximate licence exemption, further blurring the distinction between licenced and unlicenced. It is worth noting, too, that unlicenced is not the same as unregulated. Rules condition how a band is used, with or without licencing. Some proponents of the tradable/market approach criticise the license-exempt commons approach precisely because it is not sufficiently hostile to regulation. 19 Indeed, there is disagreement within the Open Spectrum movement on this point, although most proponents, from Paul Baran and Eli Noam onward, argue for minimal regulation rather than no regulation -without necessarily agreeing on what constitutes minimal regulation.
Still unaddressed are the problems at the core of the economic critique of licence exemption: if spectrum access is open to all, a band can easily become oversaturated; and if spectrum use is cost-free, there is no penalty for wasting it -until the channels become unusable. The suggestion is made below that imposing a price burden is not the only way to encourage spectrum conservation, and the tradable/flexible/market approach could itself benefit from the addition of non-monetary incentives.
Global survey of WiFi regulations
The earliest radio transmissions were unlicenced, but exemption from licencing can be said to have begun nearly 70 years ago: . 22 In addition to the texts of laws and regulations, we gather press reports and "reality check" observations from visitors, residents, development assistance agencies and other researchers, as there is sometimes a gap between official policy and implementation. We try also to acquire information spanning several years, to get a sense of how spectrum policy evolves in each locale.
With data updated to 1 December 2006, WiFi appears to be licence exempt in 67 of the 167 territories profiled in Section 3 of this report, and "nearly" licence exempt in 16 more -about 50%, in other words. At the other end of the range, 14 countries -about 8% of the total -are believed to require individual licences for all WiFi networks, 23 although some of them admit to having problems enforcing that rule, and oneEgypt -has been considering the de-licencing of WiFi for years.
These figures are not free of uncertainty. In particular, one must decide whether to consider class licencing -which is common -as licencing or as a legal fig-leaf for licence exemption. Our approach is to look carefully at how and why it is used given the local legal context. As a result some countries using class licences have been categorised as having "nearly.licence-exempt" WiFi while others were categorised as having "light-licenced" WiFi. This procedure is imperfect but it led to insights discussed in this paper.
Like general authorisation, class licencing is usually found in countries whose laws prohibit the unlicenced use of radio. Many of these laws seem to have been enacted in response to Radio Regulation S18.1 or its predecessors:
"18.1 § 1. 1) No transmitting station may be established or operated by a private person or by any enterprise without a licence issued in an appropriate form and in conformity with the provisions of these Regulations by or on behalf of the government of the country to which the station in question is subject..."
Now that various organs of the ITU and the 2004 Global Symposium of Regulators have embraced licence exemption as a "best practice" for applications like broadband wireless access and short-range devices, it might be appropriate to revisit this Regulation. A draft Question for Study to launch such a project is offered in Section 2, below.
Another category-blurring factor is phraseology that seems either self-contradictory or inconsistent with standard wordings used by regulators elsewhere. In Moldova, for example, the "general licence" needed to render a public telecommunication service is issued individually to those who apply for it.
24 El Salvador's 1997 telecom law authorised "free use bands" in which licences are required. 25 And Tanzania's regulator recognizes "exempt licences" as one of the three main types of licence. 26 Most large surveys of WiFi regulation look for general patterns to simplify and consolidate the data. Ours is no different. Issues producing discernable groupings of regulatory treatment include indoor vs. outdoor use; commercial vs. noncommercial use, and systems that serve the public vs. systems for private use only.
However, a more important result is that from a global perspective -i.e., the view seen by companies which make most of the WiFi equipment -the mosaic of national regulations is quite diverse. It forms a virtual continuum of spectrum access rights, ranging from prohibitively restrictive, to countries like Mali, which Neto describes as having "no control, monitoring, or other oversight..." 27 Between these two extremes are dozens of shades of gray. Not only is the difference between licenced and unlicenced blurred by regulators using class licences to approximate licence exemption, but conditions are routinely attached to licences and to exemptions which undo the simplicity of broad categories. God is truly in the details.
Two further points about WiFi's global spectrum rights continuum need to be made. The first is that its granularity has not forced manufacturers to make a hundred product variants, each for a different jurisdiction. The same chipset works everywhere, with software blocking a few channels in places where the full range of WiFi frequencies is not authorised. Nearly all the special conditions imposed by regulators have to do with where and how devices are deployed and used, not with the way they are built. Progress toward Software Defined Radio should make it easier for manufacturers to comply with distinctive local rules, 28 but in the meantime the situation for hardware defined WiFi is still tolerable.
Second, WiFi's spectrum rights continuum is not manifest in any one country. Each country contributes one, two or perhaps three clearly defined steps. The continuum only exists as a transnational composite, and even then, "continuum" is more a metaphor than an exact description, since a close look reveals that it is actually composed of many small increments. But in a globalized economy, this "quantized continuum" is just as real as each set of national regulations. Information about WiFi regulation at the national level is increasingly available now that most regulators have websites, and professional channels of communication among regulators have improved, thanks to the ITU and the growth of regional associations of regulators. It is only a matter of time before all regulators perceive the transnational rights continuum as clearly as multinational corporations do, and when that happens it will become a strong influence in policymaking at the national level.
A spectrum access rights continuum is fundamentally different from traditional licensing, from a tradablerights regime and from a licence-exempt commons. Therefore, it can be considered a new paradigm, even though it seems to have emerged spontaneously. Would there be any reason to develop such a continuum intentionally? Would that be useful?
Multidimensional assessments, non-monetary rewards
WiFi's global spectrum rights continuum is distantly related to a scheme proposed by Kalle Kontson and Michael O'Hehir. In their presentation at last year's ISART symposium, they outlined a "regulatory model that rewards the implementation and deployment of spectrum-efficient technologies by offering incentives in the form of progressively expanded tiers of spectrum access rights in proportion to device performance." 29 A device's standing in the access rights continuum would be based on a "scorecard" assessing the device's "good spectrum citizenship." This scorecard would be a refinement of existing processes of equipment testing and type approval. Instead of a simple binary judgment -approved or not approved -devices would be graded according to a "standard set of metrics and tools to assess the worthiness of individual devices to reap rewards for good spectrum behavior, and restrict bad behavior." Points might be awarded for spectral efficiency, resistance to interference, high data throughput, etc., while points might be subtracted for spurious emissions, lack of automatic transmit power control, the absence of interference mitigation techniques, etc. The net effect would be that higher scoring devices would enjoy more rights. That is not to imply that rights would depend simply on the total points earned, however. A key feature of the scorecard is that it represents a multi-dimensional matrix that can link different kinds of rights to different equipment characteristics. But in any case, devices falling below some minimum score would have no spectrum access rights at all.
Kontson has a contract now with the US Department of Defense (DoD) to identify characteristics that should be reported on the scorecard, the scoring method, and models of how such a system might coexist with other spectrum management approaches. It may seem a speculative exercise, but this "Spectrum Scorecard Initiative" was presented as a "Key Theme for 2006-2007" by Badri Younes (DoD's Director of Spectrum Management) at the US National Spectrum Managers conference last May. 30 Technologies that gain that level of support from the US military can have spillover effects in civilian life.
Marianna Goldhamer, chairperson of the IEEE 802.16h Licence Exempt Task Group (and Director of Strategic Technologies at Alvarion) proposed something similar -although simpler -at the ITU Workshop on "Radio Spectrum Management for a Converging World" (Geneva, 17 February 2004). On that occasion she offered a new Question for Study: how to define new rules for the co-existence of different classes of equipment whose power levels are determined by their "co-existence capabilities." 31 Evan Kwerel and John Williams also proposed a spectrum rights continuum, but based on payments rather than performance. They suggest letting licencees "charge manufacturers a fee for the right to produce and market devices to operate in [a given] band. Such contracts could provide different grades of access for different fees, thus providing for a wider range of uses than are possible under the current rules." 32 A system linking device performance to spectrum access rights would be challenging to implement. Unless carefully introduced, it could conflict with the awarding of spectrum rights by auction, trade or payment, and with the creation of technology-neutral bands enabling flexible use. However, there is a body of econometric research, dealing mainly with government procurement and the extraction of natural resources, which looks at auction design, bid evaluation and bidding strategies in situations where the bids are multidimensional, combining variables like price and quality. The quality component itself is normally multidimensional and represented on a scorecard created by the buyer. This work may be relevant to Kontson and O'Hehir's proposal -and to other rights continua -as it suggests ways to integrate performance and pricing. 33 To avoid conflicts with existing spectrum trading schemes, the use of device scorecards to regulate spectrum access might be introduced first in governmental bands -and/or in licence exempt bands, where nonmonetary incentives for good behaviour are needed, and where spectrum is not bought or sold anyway. It is still not clear how quality of service requirements of applications hosted on other devices in range would be taken into account -or how the location of the device in operation would be factored in. Even so, the idea seems clearly applicable to cognitive radio overlays. 34 In a real-time market for interference or spectrum access rights, a device's electromagnetic compatiblity score could act as a proxy for interference risk and be converted into a coefficient modifying the cost of temporary spectrum use. Rewards, penalties and valuations make Kontson and O'Hehir's concept market-like even though it is an administrative system.
Separating scoring methods from principles
Economic principles contribute more to spectrum management than just income from auctions and tenders. Regulators seem to "buy" arguments for utilising market forces because they recognise the logic of letting spectrum users make acquisition and disposition decisions based on their own assessment of their own needs -which they understand better than the regulator. Decisions based on self-assessed need do not have to be monetised, actually. We can evaluate choices critically and quantitatively, even when no money changes hands. Economists argue that spectrum pricing is necessary to prevent bandwidth waste and to ensure "high value" uses are supplied with sufficient channel capacity. But what is actually needed are burdens and rewards, incentives and disincentives, that correlate with resource availability in the real world. Price is just a scoring method -and it may be too simplistic for multidimensional assessments of value.
Poor people and small corporations are disadvantaged in any cash-for-access system. That is rather obvious. I would submit that the proper goal for regulators is to minimise interference while maximising social benefits and encouraging improvements in radio technology, not to keep the poor from sending and receiving information. Therefore, it is worth asking: is there a rational method for awarding spectrum access rights which empowers users, maximises benefits to society and advances the art of radio without creating entry barriers that can only be surmounted with cash? Spectrum entry barriers should exclude noisy, deaf and inefficient equipment, not merely people who are underfunded.
That implies a strategy different from the liberalisation now influencing spectrum managementliberalisation defined as licence trading and after-markets rather than inclusion and freedom to communicate. Can economic mechanisms be distilled into an accurately targeted system of incentives and disincentives which produce desirable real-world results without relying on a metric that has negative repercussions on social equity? Can radio regulation break the authoritarian habit of forbidding everything that is not specifically authorised, and instead permit everything not specifically forbidden? 35 That would be true liberalisation. that Radio Regulation S18.1 says: "No transmitting station may be established or operated by a private person or by any enterprise without a licence issued in an appropriate form and in conformity with the provisions of these Regulations by or on behalf of the government of the country to which the station in question is subject..." noting a) that the allocation of spectrum for licence-exempt use is increasingly recognized as a catalyst for the development of more efficient and cost-effective wireless technologies; b)
NOTES:
that there is growing public demand for short-range radio applications in which any risk of harmful interference is limited to a small area; c) that there are useful applications where the licensing of individual emitters is neither feasible nor necessary -radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, for example;
that licencing is not the only effective means for preventing interference or setting requirements for public service;
decides that the following Question should be studied:
1
How can RR S18.1 be reconciled with the growing acceptance of licence exemption as a regulatory "best practice" under certain conditions? further decides 1 that the results of the above studies should be included in a Recommendation and/or Report; 2 that the above studies should be completed by 2010. 
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